“We ask only three things from NATO: weapons, weapons, weapons”. The appeal of the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba – combined with those repeated several times by President Volodymyr Zelensky – is permeated by a sense of unexceptionable urgency. Ukraine insists that the delays in arms supplies for Kiev have cost the defenders blood and ground, and that there is little time left to prepare the defenses in Donbass before the next Russian offensive.
It may seem paradoxical, but the accusatory requests from the Ukrainian side definitely have a grain of truth precisely because supplies would be decisive for the general course of the war, not so much for the immediate contribution they would make to Ukrainian defenses.
Much has already been written about the weapons needed by Ukraine to resist the Russian advance, which quickly stalled in the first days of the war. In the first phase of the conflict, the focus was mainly on providing those systems useful for arming an armed resistance and organizing a flexible defense, based on ambushes, raids and retreats in combat.
In these hours the discussion on the advisability of arming the Ukrainian army with offensive weapons has begun again with vigor, a misleading definition that exchanges the method of use of a weapon and the operational capabilities to which it gives access.
Two simple examples help to frame the question. Armored vehicles (tanks, self-propelled artillery and transport armored vehicles for infantry) are often associated with large armored battles or assaults combined arms like those who bloodied this region seventy years ago. However, armored vehicles are units that operate in symbiosis with the infantry and that also play a role in a defensive system, especially on such an extensive and poorly fortified front as the Ukrainian one. Repelling the enemy is not limited to defending a position, but also being able to challenge its recent conquests and prevent it from having a moment to pause to prepare for new offensives.
Ukrainian losses are currently more uncertain than Russian ones, mainly as outside observers are reluctant to disclose sensitive information about the defenders. According to Stijn Mitze of Oryx, however, Ukraine has lost about a hundred tanks and about sixty infantry vehicles, which if not replaced will preclude local counter-offensives, as well as exploit any weak points in the Russian lines and keep the pressure high. in regions like Kherson.
The second example concerns the Switchblades suicide drones: so far they have been presented as a defensive system and similar to shoulder-borne anti-tank missiles, along the lines of the Javelin. However, being a suicide drone, the Switchblade can be easily piloted against targets up to forty kilometers away: it allows you to hit the supplies of Russian forces engaged in offensive operations, but also to cripple the enemy’s logistics system in preparation for an attack.
To these are added systems that would compensate for the specific weaknesses of the Ukrainian army in any operational context. Kiev has insufficient artillery corps to provide immediate support to the front and, above all, to engage its Russian counterpart in remote duels, which plays a key role in the invader’s offensive doctrine.
In addition, Ukraine is suffering from a low number of anti-aircraft systems capable of countering Russian tactical bombers. Even if absent in the early stages of the war, the Russian air force (RuAF) could return to be decisive if the attackers continue to concentrate their offensives and thus allow the RuAF to impose local air superiority in the areas of operation.
Rather than distinguishing between offensive and defensive weapons, it makes sense to talk about easily usable weapons, complex systems such as planes and tanks already known to the Ukrainian armed forces and new complex systems corresponding to NATO standards.
The latter are also those that have aroused the greatest political tensions, especially in countries such as Germany: they would require a medium-term commitment from the Allied side to train Ukrainian operators, as well as a guarantee with respect to the supply of spare parts. This would also amount to admitting that the war will last indefinitely – as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has speculated – and that arrangements will be needed to support the Ukrainian war effort. It should be remembered that the operational proficiency demonstrated so far with Western systems is also due to the long training and support missions of the United States and its allies.
It is very easy to forget that no war is decided only on the ground. The political context remains of primary importance, and military victories count in the capacity in which they influence the dynamics in the political arena. The heavy equipment required by Ukraine is unlikely to contribute to the defense in the Donbass, at least in the coming weeks. However, the Ukrainian leadership is well aware that a sudden increase in its military capabilities will weigh on the future calculations of the Russians.
An army capable of mounting more dynamic operations, calibrated on a war of attrition but capable of challenging the invaders even in the open field would immensely complicate the strategic environment in which the Russian army would operate. And it is precisely this complexity that has an impact on the duration of the conflict and the intensity of the attacks launched by the Russians.
It is clear that all this will weigh on the negotiations and that, from an operational point of view, a upgrade of the Ukrainian army can only happen as quickly as possible: the more time the Russians have to anticipate the rebalancing of forces in Kiev, the better they will be able to intervene with adequate countermeasures. And the more pressure will build on the Russian command to act forcefully before the window of opportunity closes.
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