The sinking of the cruiser Moskva represents a huge setback for Russian military pride. As noted by many commentators, the inglorious demise of the Soviet-made ship can be metaphorically interpreted as yet another nail in the coffin of Russian imperialist ambitions. For folklore lovers, the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet would also appear to be sunk with a piece of the True Cross, or at least a sliver of wood deemed such by the Orthodox Church and transferred aboard in 2020. Moscow has for now denied that the ship was sunk by the Ukrainians, but the targeted bombing of a Neptune anti-ship missile production site in Kyiv on the night of Thursday to Friday suggests that the Russians suddenly feel the need to cripple Ukrainian coastal defense capabilities.
That said, it would be wrong to define this defeat as a breakthrough in the invasion. In war there are rarely decisive battles; those that can be considered as such are not so much because they change the course of the war, but because they bring out the economic, political and social factors that decide the fate of the conflict. From this point of view, the hysteria of Russian state TV commentators and the performance of the presenter Olga Skabeyeva as an avenging angel is certainly more interesting than the military figure.
Indeed, the role of the Moskva in Russian maritime operations speaks volumes about the deficiencies of the Black Sea Fleet and the little impact of the naval dimension on this war. The Moskva was already known in the news for having been theatrically sent to that country by the defenders of the Island of the Snakes off the coast of Odessa after the ultimatum that preceded its conquest. Already in that action it was possible to identify the mission of the fleet in the Russian invasion plans: to secure the approaches to Odessa, to impose a naval blockade on Ukrainian trade routes and to support land operations on the Black Sea coast. A misunderstanding that seems to be common. most Western commentators are Moskva’s ability to conduct deep bombing on Ukrainian logistical hubs.
Many speculate that the cruiser was equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles (presumably of the 3M14K model supplied by the Russian navy) with a range between 2500 and 4000 km. Indeed, the modernization program carried out between 2017 and 2020 provided that the ship, designed essentially to attack American aircraft carriers and provide an anti-aircraft umbrella to the fleet, would replace the 16 P-1000 Vulkan anti-ship missile launchers with Onyx and Kalibr missiles. However, all Russian press releases and articles published at the end of the program suggest that the only weapon aboard the Moskva suitable for hitting targets on the ground were heavy artillery pieces, with a range of only 22 kilometers. It is therefore likely that the ballistic bombardment provided by the fleet is mainly the work of the two ships of the “Krivak” class and the three of the “Admiral Grigorovich” class present in the Black Sea, to which are added those with pure anti-ship capabilities of the 166th division. of Novorossysk, some submarines and numerous minelayers and transport ships.
This detail is very important because it reduces the contribution that the cruiser could make to the Russian campaign. To give any kind of support to ground operations, Moskva would have had to move very close to the coast. According to Business Insider military sources, the cruiser was approximately 60 naval miles from shore (approximately 111 km) at the time of the explosion, firmly within range of Ukrainian defenses. Kyiv is in fact in an advantageous position as regards the defense of its coasts. After losing 70% of its ships following the annexation of Crimea, the government has favored the development of one mosquito fleet, designed to provide deterrence against possible Russian coastal operations. In March, Ukraine had planned to deploy 70 Neptune missiles, produced locally since 2013 and with a range of 300 kilometers. To these will be added new missile systems supplied by the United Kingdom, with which the batteries deployed in Odessa could theoretically also target approaches to Sevastopol, the main Russian naval base in the region.
Having confirmed the Ukrainian ability to defend its coast makes it possible to exclude, at least in the coming weeks, an amphibious operation against Odessa. Without being able to impose naval and air supremacy, a landing would be extremely dangerous and difficult to complete successfully. A Russian insertion force could not count on the support of the troops deployed in Transnistria (a few thousand soldiers poorly armed and probably unable to conquer the railways around the city). Even for the Russian forces in Kherson it will be very difficult to mount a new offensive if the Black Sea Fleet cannot support its advance with naval artillery, and without the constant threat of a landing west of Mylokaiv the Ukrainians have all the prerequisites for transforming the city into a cornerstone.
Eliminating Moskva will have less impact on operations in Ukraine. While this is not a turning point, we must not ignore the benefits that Kyiv will derive from this naval victory. In addition to the immense propaganda value of the action, the cruiser contributed to anti-aircraft defenses in the Crimea and Russian naval supremacy in the Black Sea. The Turkish decision to close the Bosphorus and implement the Montreux agreements means that the Russians will not be able to strengthen the Black Sea fleet with boats from other fleets, an operation already carried out before the outbreak of the war. As long as hostilities persist, only ships with their port of origin in Sevastopol will be able to cross the strait. The loss of the flagship will also weaken Russia’s ability to use the Black Sea as a stepping stone to the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria.
The sinking of the Moskva is one of many demonstrations of a military modernization program that leaves much to be desired and which, while not altering the course of the war, will help the Ukrainians to continue resisting the invader.
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