The continuation of the war adds new atrocities and misery every day to the long list of cruelties inflicted by Russian forces. The rush of time also swells the uncertainty linked to the next moves by the Kremlin, whose intentions are still shrouded in a thick fog of war.
Of course, it is quite easy to get an idea of the project pursued by Moscow and which one is yours strategic logic: Vladimir Putin and his institutional avatars have the virtue of being honest about what they want, just as they were in the days leading up to the invasion.
Canceling Ukrainian sovereignty by any means will remain the Russian goal as long as the government continues to see itself engaged in political conflict with the United States and Bornand the current war can only be understood as one chapter of that larger confrontation.
It is precisely this global background that prevents us from predicting what costs the Kremlin will be willing to incur in the course of di what he defined “special operation“. That the Russian authorities have threatened Washington with “unforeseeable consequences” if the United States continues to supply Kiev with advanced weapons it is symptomatic of the great impact they are having on the field.
From a Russian realistic perspective, American support is also a predictable behavior, since the White House is considered the control center of all movements considered to be Russophobic, Nazi, terrorist or otherwise opposed to the Kremlin’s sphere of influence in Eurasia. .
This unalterable certainty makes it very difficult to judge where the red line is, beyond which the Kremlin would opt for a ‘escalation hostilities. Not only that, but it is also difficult to assess what this escalation in facts may consist of (with all due respect to many talk show analysts who rattle off the next Russian moves with the furious certainty of those who scramble for mirrors).
Perhaps a more useful exercise is to explore what uncertainties prevent us from predicting a possible Russian escalation.
The most pressing question concerns the type of weapons supplied by the West: how accurate is it to think that the supply of “offensive” weapons could precipitate a Russian attack on P.aesi Born? Already two weeks ago – in this article – we described the classification into “defensive” and “offensive” weapons such as very tenuous, and although some weapon systems can be used to strike the territory of the Russian Federation (mostly Cacciabombardieri), the distinction is flexible and politically determined by Moscow. The arms supply itself, without a significant change in Ukrainian military posture, would not justify a Russian intervention to block supplies to Ukraine.
The assumption on which many analysts (and others) are operating is that the increased pressure from the Russians may be based on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, a class of devices that abound in Russian arsenals. As is well known, Moscow foresees scenarios in which it could arrive at the use of nuclear weapons when there is an existential threat to the survival of the State, as well as situations in which tactical nuclear weapons (therefore with a lower power than those foreseen for attacks against cities) could be used to force a conventional enemy to demand a ceasefire.
An element against this interpretation is that the Russians are very cautious about everything related to nuclear weapons. Despite the tensions, the recent test of the Satan-2 ICBM has been heralded under all relevant protocols to the United States. TOEven the imposition of a nuclear alert in February was more of a no-consequence threat than a true paradigm shift.
In addition, a strategic perspective that imagines Russia in an unlimited political war with the Born, it is the imposition of systemic sanctions that would come closest to an “existential danger” for the survival of the regime. To risk nuclear Armageddon for gas sanctions? Again, this is an unlikely scenario that nuclear deterrence experts have serious doubts about.
Finally, there remains the option of using non-nuclear weapons, such as electronic warfare measures or the launch of a “warning missile” against infrastructure in Poland. This would certainly be a viable intermediate option that would reduce the risk of a Russian misunderstanding or loss of control.
On the other hand, the widespread failure of some Russian weapon systems in Ukraine also indicates the risk of one gaffe international if a hypothetical missile was intercepted in its trajectory towards territories Bornor if the electronic warfare measures should prove more manageable than expected. The consequence would be the deterioration of the Russian deterrence force and a loss of credibility.
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