A neologism rages in the German media: “Scholzen”, the declination of Scholz, meaning hesitation, indecision, as a mockery of the new chancellor, a “sor hesitates”, as we say.
Plunging into the polls, Olaf Scholz continues to speak out and contradict himself on essential issues. The latest episode saw his government initially refuse to supply heavy weapons to Ukraine on the grounds that training in the use of the Ukrainian military takes six months, clearly too much and above all and officially “not to favor a escalation “. In fact, a stop to efficient and useful supplies, so much so that the list of German arms supply to Volodymyr Zelensky has been deducted from 48 pages to 24 which contained a list of weapons of more than marginal importance.
Then, seven days ago, the Scholz government was seen announcing a hypocritical triangulation with Slovakia through the mouth of Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht. The scheme called for Prague to supply Kiev with its old and obsolete Soviet-made T72 tanks and in a circular exchange Berlin would supply Slovakia with armored vehicles for the Marder infantry and Fuchs troop carriers. Unsatisfactory exchange not only for Ukraine, which asked for modern tanks, but also for Prague, which asked for Leopard 2 tanks and Boxer 2 armored vehicles, in short, aggressive armament instead of troop transport vehicles.
Finally, all of a sudden, under heavy, very heavy pressure from the Liberals and the Greens, the United States and NATO, Scholz made a 180 degree turn and at Ramstein’s League for Ukraine meeting on Tuesday he finally made a commitment. to supply Ukraine with 50 Gepard tanks, with anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, however obsolete weapons, so much so that they are no longer used by the Bundeswehr and are stored in warehouses.
These hesitations, beyond the contingent fact, which is also very serious, reveal the real problem of Germany, the heart of Europe: it has no strategic lines, it absolutely does not move on the basis of a “doctrine”, it even takes the luxury of not even having defined the precursors of a new foreign policy adequate to the planetary earthquake unleashed by Vladimir Putin.
The Scholz government is groping in the narrow margins of a defensive position all and only aimed at remedying the sensational and brandish geopolitical errors of Angela Merkel – under accusation today in all the media – as of Gerhard Schröder. These limitations appeared striking in the long and harsh interview of the weekly Der Spiegel with the Chancellor himself.
To bring them into focus, it is sufficient to read Scholz’s disjointed answer to the question about his refusal to suspend Russian gas supplies via North Stream 1 as soon as possible: “First: I don’t see at all how a gas embargo would end the war. If Putin had been open to economic arguments, he would never have started this crazy war. Second: the point is another, we want to avoid a dramatic economic crisis, the loss of millions of jobs and factories that would never reopen. This would have great consequences for our country, and for all of Europe, and would also have a great impact on the financing of Ukraine’s reconstruction. Therefore, it is my responsibility to say that we cannot allow this. Third: is there anyone who is really thinking about the global consequences? “
Hypocritical contortions, among which the impossibility for Germany, in the event of a Russian gas blockade, to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine tomorrow.
The serious problem, with all evidence, is that this political contortion does not concern only the personal leadership, obviously mediocre, of the Chancellor himself. The real problem concerns the whole coalition (the liberals are only attentive to the economy, with an ordoliberal rigorous tare, the Greens only to the ecological transition), but above all the “German system” itself. In fact, there is not even a trace in the current German political debate of alternative strategies to those – which have proved to be fallacious or unsuccessful – of Angela Merkel or Gerhard Schröder. The very intense Ostpolitik of the two turned out to be all in favor of Putin, who was handed a weapon of blackmail and formidable pressure.
But there is more: how will Germany correct its economic model entirely based on the paroxysmal export – in violation of the Maastricht parameters – of capital and consumer goods, first and foremost the China-Russia blockade that is only now being discovered not just an opponent, but an alternative one?
And even before that: what is the strategy, the vision of international relations as an alternative to failure Werfel durch Handel, change through trade? Having verified that globalized trade does not induce democratic change either in Beijing or in Moscow – indeed, it has made them more aggressive in the name of an autocratic alternative to society – what will be the new strategic vision of Berlin, beyond the purely economic data?
The current pneumatic vacuum in the elaboration of the leadership of the German government obviously impacts like a ballast on the whole of Europe. Even more so when Scholz extemporaneously announced, the day after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, that he wanted to double Germany’s military spending from 50 billion to 100 billion. A choice clearly based on Keynesian economic motivations, to compensate for the decline in exports. But also linked to a fact that has only emerged today: the Bundeswehr is ineffective, obsolete, badly organized and even worse structured. A substantially useless army.
The problem refers to the postulate of Carl von Clausewitz: a massive German rearmament may certainly be a good thing, but to pursue what policy? At the moment the answer is emptiness. A tragedy for the whole of Europe.
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