In recent weeks, the war in Ukraine has been transformed: due to a number of factors (not least the Western support received) Kiev has managed to contain the Moscow offensive, forcing the Russian army to reorganize. But with the approach of the second phase of the conflict, which will mainly affect the areas to the south-east of the country, Europe is discussing how to continue to support Ukraine, evaluating sanctions, sending weapons and strategies for reducing energy dependence. from Moscow.
As in the first days of the invasion, Germany is at the center of attention: Berlin has historical economic relations with Moscow, on which it is heavily dependent in terms of energy supply. A trend that grew during the years of Angela Merkel, and which has its roots in Ostpolitik German, based on the assumption that ever closer economic relations between Europe and Russia would have made it impossible for geopolitical and military tensions to grow.
With the invasion of Ukraine, this scenario turned out to be illusory. The government led by Olaf Scholz, which sees mostly Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals, then initiated what has been commented on in many quarters as a U-turn of German foreign policy, and that the Chancellor himself defined an epochal turning point. Berlin has blocked the activation of the disputed NordStream 2 gas pipeline, after having presented it for years as a purely economic project, unrelated to the geopolitical plan. Subsequently, two great German taboos were broken: the increase in military spending, with the provision of a special fund of 100 billion and the increase in defense spending to 2% of GDP, as well as the sending of weapons in conflict zones, through the shipment of arms to Ukraine.
With the second phase of the war, however, Germany returned to having to face some choices, fueling internal conflicts as well as frictions with European partners. The issue of energy dependence on Moscow remains open, especially as regards natural gas, an essential source for Berlin if it wants to achieve its energy and climate goals by 2040.
In Europe, the pressure to suspend the import of Russian gas is increasing from various quarters, but Germany is holding back: in the European Council, Scholz has spoken out against a stop to imports, thus affecting the EU as a whole . A move viewed with suspicion by the various Eastern European countries that are lobbying to stop imports, and which, moreover, is in open contrast with the European Parliament, which in the last plenary session approved a resolution in which it asks to close the taps with Fly.
It is clear that a stop to Russian gas would have major consequences for the German economy, and the government is concerned about the scenario of a recession. Two days ago, Emily Haber, the German ambassador to Washington, said on Twitter that a total stop to Russian gas “would have repercussions that would go well beyond Germany”, while “it is not clear what effect it would have on Russia” given that ” Putin does not seem to think according to an analysis of costs and benefits ». Already in recent weeks, both Scholz and Habeck (the green head of the Ministry of Economy) have made it clear to the public that the sanctions already in place will have consequences on the economy: “We will become poorer, and our society will have to do come to terms with this, ”said Habeck in an interview with ZDF. According to a poll by the Allensbach polling institute, 71% of Germans say rising energy prices are their biggest concern right now.
It is clear that the block on imports would take place in a complex context and would have an impact on public opinion. However, it is not certain that the Germans are opposed to more drastic measures towards Russia: in a survey carried out for WDR, 50% expressed themselves in favor of a block on Russian oil and gas imports, with 42% against. (down from the past). Public opinion is therefore very divided on the issue, however according to the same poll 45% of Germans argue that the German response to Russia was not sufficient, against 11% who define it excessive and 37% who consider it adequate. . Any choice made in energy matters, therefore, could weigh on the government in terms of consensus.
Furthermore, within the majority, there are differences regarding the sending of weapons. The Foreign Minister, the green Annalena Baerbock, had authorized the supply of about one hundred tanks to Ukraine, which was later canceled by Scholz; Furthermore, the Chancellor seems reticent about sending new armaments, and it is precisely on this point that tensions with the Grüne, government allies. But on this point there are different positions even within the Greens themselves, as evidenced by the fact that last week Habeck declared to the Politico magazine that the sending of tanks, as they are considered heavy weapons, has been << so far excluded by all. NATO countries >> is therefore that every decision in merit must be discussed in the European forum or in the Atlantic alliance.
Indeed, the current phase experienced by Berlin shows how the Zeitenwende proclaimed by Scholz is more troubled and complex than its announcement to parliament at the end of February would suggest. Ties with Moscow, strengthened by Merkel’s foreign policy, are difficult to sever in the short term without economic repercussions and without an increase in geopolitical tensions. For Germany, after breaking the taboo on military spending, it is now a question of achieving at all levels (and with the difficulties of the case) the transition initiated by Scholz in the field of foreign policy.
In this perspective, not only the uncertainties of the Chancellor are explained, but also why, on the domestic front, the greatest frictions are produced precisely with the Greens. THE Grünein fact, they are traditionally critical of Merkel’s foreign policy and the economic weight of ties with Russia and China, and are therefore by their very nature the most suitable political force to interpret the wing of the majority more favorable to accelerating independence from Moscow and reinforce support for Ukraine, while being aware of the difficulties and inherent risks.
Habeck has already initiated contacts with other countries to replace Moscow (sometimes even with realities, such as Qatar, which could raise questions of political expediency for the Greens). But criticism also comes from the other government allies, the liberals of the FDP: Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, president of the defense commission of the Bundestag, recently accused Scholz of lack of clarity on the direction to take after the Zeitenwende. In this situation of strong internal conflict within the government, an Insa survey published on Sunday revealed that only 38% of the people interviewed declare themselves absolutely satisfied with Scholz’s work: a certain child of the moment and potentially subject to strong changes already in the short term. , but emblematic, also because the lowest since the beginning of the chancellery.
In the coming weeks we will find out if the German uncertainties will be overcome, as they did in the first days of the war, or if they prove insurmountable. On the basis of developments, it will also be understood in a more definite way how much Scholz’s Germany will be different from that of Angela Merkel, and how the internal relations of the current majority will shape.
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